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Introduction
A regional security complex (RSC) is a set of states continuously affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geographic area.1 In such a complex, the members are so interrelated in terms of their security that actions by any one member, and significant security-related developments inside any member, have First, Lake and Morgan allow for overlapping regions, such that membership in an RSC is not exclusive, whereas Buzan and Waever insist on exclusivity, but then allow for regional sub-complexes within RSCs. In most cases, our overlapping regions correspond to their sub-complexes and RSCs, although since Lake and Morgan and the authors of the individual regional chapters are admittedly not as systematic in identifying RSCs as Buzan and Waever this is hard to discern conclusively. Second, Lake and Morgan allow great powers from outside the immediate geographic area to be members of RSCs, muddying the distinction between system and region according to Buzan and Waever, while again Buzan and Waever insist on exclusive membership, even for great powers. Buzan and Waever solve this 'great power' problem, on the other hand, by developing the concepts of penetration and overlay, which permit the great powers to be seen as integral to an RSC without being members. I think this is largely an issue of semantics rather than deep theory. For purposes of theoretical cumulation, I will adopt Buzan and Waever's conception of RSC on this second point, and refer to the roles of non-regional great powers as penetration and overlay.
35 a major impact on others. Regional orders describe how states within an RSC manage their security relations and range from balances of power, to regional power concerts, collective security organisations, pluralistic security communities, and integration. As regional states move 'up' this continuum of regional orders, relations generally become more peaceful and interactions less coloured by actual or threat ened violence.2
In an earlier essay, I argued that the choice or emergence of a regional order is strongly conditioned by the openness and political structure of the RSC, where structure was largely confined to variations in the distribution of capabilities.3 Unipolar RSCs are most likely to be autonomous (not greatly affected by extra regional politics) and effectively stabilised by a single, dominant power; multipolar regional systems will also be relatively autonomous but plagued by difficulties of conflict management and limited to balance of power or regional power concerts; and bipolar systems will draw in 'outside' parties and be highly competitive and conflict prone. Evidence from diverse regions offers some support for these predictions. 4 In this article, I examine variation in the ordering principle of international relations across RSCs and its effects on regional order.5 The standard assumption made by scholars and policy makers alike is that the international system is anarchic, or characterised by the absence of authority higher than the state, and all relations between states within that system are likewise anarchic. This assumption, in turn, is based on a formal-legal conception of authority that rules out by definition the possibility of international hierarchy: since there is no source of law higher than states themselves, there is no law that confers authority on states. In related work, I
argue that states often form hierarchies over one another based on relational authority, which itself rests on social contract theories that posit authority as an emergent property or equilibrium of an exchange between a dominant state and the set of citizens who comprise the subordinate state. In particular, I argue that this exchange entails the provision by the dominant state of a social order of value to the subordinate state in return for the subordinate's compliance and legitimacy.6
Regional orders emerge because of the strong positive externalities of social order and economies of scale in its production, and the mutually reinforcing legitimacy accorded the dominant state by local subordinates. This implies that regions characterised by the hierarchy of single dominant states will possess 'higher' or more peaceful regional orders. Specifically, I suggest that regions often described as Structure of International Security, distinguish only between conflict formations, similar to balance of power orders, security regimes, similar to regional power concerts and collective security organisations, and security communities, similar to pluralistic security communities and integration.
pluralistic security communities in which cooperation is understood to have emerged spontaneously from anarchy are better described, at least in their early stages if not beyond, as regional hierarchies in which peace and conflict regulation are the products of the authority of a dominant state. Section 1 summarises the notion of relational authority and its implications for dyadic relations between dominant and subordinate states. Section 2 extends this analysis to include regional interactions and their effects. I examine empirical patterns of regional hierarchy in Section 3 and their implications for the regional orders observed over the last half century in Section 4.
Relational authority, hierarchy, and international relations Scholars of international relationists assume, rightly, that the international system as a whole is anarchic, or lacking in a single overarching authority.7 In the absence of a world government, this is a truism. But it is a fallacy of division to assume that because the system is anarchic all relationships within that system are anarchic as well. Relations between states can be and often are characterised by varying degrees of authority and, in turn, hierarchy.8
Political authority is most simply defined as rightful or legitimate rule.9 When political authority is exercised, the ruler, A, commands a set of subordinates, B, to alter their actions, where command implies that A has the right to issue such orders.10
This right, in turn, implies an obligation or duty by B to comply, if possible, with A's order. B's obligation implies a further correlative right by A to enforce its commands in the event of B's noncompliance. Authority and, specifically, the right to punish noncompliance ultimately rests on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler's right to rule. In this way, authority is fundamentally a social construct.
Scholars of international relations typically rely on a formal-legal conception of authority.11 In this view, authority is conferred on rulers by prior lawful institutions.
One day, for instance, Arnold Schwarzenegger is simply a B-grade actor famous for his bodybuilding and bloody, violent action movies. The next day, after winning an unprecedented but constitutionally permitted recall election against a slate of over 100 candidates, Schwarzenegger became the Governor of California, with all the rights, duties, and powers -indeed, the authority -of that office. In this way, lawful institutions precede and confer authority upon individuals, who then exercise the prerogatives of office to secure their rule. In turn, since there is no lawful institution to confer authority on particular states within the international system, a formal-legal approach implies that the system and all relations between states within that system must be anarchic, or devoid of authority. This formal-legal conception of authority may be appropriate for established regimes in which the rule of law prevails. But it is only one possible conception of authority. Even excluding religious, traditional or other forms of authority, political authority has multiple sources. In contractual theories of the state,12 the anthropo logical literature on emergent societies,13 and sociology more generally,14 authority is understood to emerge from 'practice' based on an exchange of public goods and services by the ruler for compliance and obligation by the ruled. In equilibrium, A provides a social order of sufficient value to B to earn his compliance to the extractions necessary to the provision of that order, where following Hedley Bull a social order is defined as 'a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary, or universal goals of social life', including security against violence resulting in death or bodily harm, an assurance that property will not be subject to challenges that are constant or without limit, and an expectation that promises and agreements, once made, will be kept.15 Such relational authorities can exist not only within but also between states, with one state providing an international order of value to others to earn their compliance with its authority. Dominant states provide order and, in turn, make demands on other states; subordinate states benefit from the order and regard the commands of the dominant state necessary for that order as legitimate and, therefore, authoritative. Key is that both the dominant and subordinate states understand that the dominant state has the right to make certain demands, rooted in its 'special responsibilities' for social order, and the subordinate state has an obligation to comply with those commands if made.
Hierarchy exists when one actor possesses authority over a second. Authority is never total, of course, but varies in extent. A may possess authority over B and issue commands regulating possible actions 1-5 but not on actions 6-n, which remain 'private' to B or beyond A's ability to expect compliance. In other words, B may recognise the legitimacy of A's commands regulating its security relations with third parties (A commands B not to ally with others), but not that of any commands she may or may not issue on security cooperation with itself (A commands B to join her in a war). In this case, a partial hierarchy exists. Hierarchy increases with the number of B's actions A can legitimately regulate. If A previously possessed authority over actions 1-5 and now exerts authority over issues 1-8, for instance, her hierarchy over B has increased; to continue the example, if A now gains the authority to command B to assist it in a conflict, A's hierarchy over B has expanded.
So defined, hierarchy is a continuous variable that varies by the number of actions over which A can legitimately issue commands and expect compliance by B. At one extreme, A possesses no authority over any action B might perform. This is the ideal of 'Westphalian sovereignty' and the condition of anarchy that is commonly (but mistakenly) thought to characterise all relationships within the international sys tem.16 At the other extreme, A possesses the authority to regulate all actions B might perform. In this extreme of complete hierarchy, B possesses no independent rights or autonomous ability to decide anything and is subservient to A in all aspects of social life. In international relations, the most hierarchical relationships take the form of empires, where B is subordinate to A in a broad range of economic and security 
Regional hierarchies
Although considered only as dyads in the work summarised above, hierarchies tend to cluster by region, with many states possessing relatively similar levels of subordination to the same dominant state. This mutual subordination, in turn, reinforces the effects of hierarchy just enumerated, creating a regional systems effect that arises from their interaction within a shared or common condition. Feeling more secure under the protective umbrella of the dominant state (a dyadic effect), subordinate states know that their neighbours are similarly protected and con strained by the dominant state against overly aggressive actions. Subordinates also know that disputes with other subordinates are likely to be (at least informally) managed or arbitrated by the dominant state. This can lead to tough or even extreme bargaining between subordinates, and may generate considerable ill-will, but disputes are less likely to escalate to violence. Moreover, knowing that their partners are bound under the same economic regimes and more likely to be open to trade, mutual subordinates are even more willing to enter a division of labour and allow exchange to flourish. These regional systems effects are hard to distinguish from the dyadic effects summarised above, but there are strong reasons to expect them to be real and substantively important.19 Hierarchy tends to cluster by region for three related reasons: positive externalities, scale economies in producing social order, and international legitimacy. First, social order is a local public good that often extends beyond the boundaries of any single subordinate state. Within countries, social order is usually provided by states, which can legitimately use violence to enforce rules and thereby have a comparative advantage in solving collective action problems. Similarly, within a dyad, a dominant state provides a measure of social order for the subordinate state in return for compliance with the rules it creates. Social order, however, can extend beyond the boundaries of a given state. Deterring threats to a single subordinate from, say, a rogue regime may also reduce threats to others in same region. Intervening in conflicts involving a subordinate also reduces the likelihood of violence getting 'out of hand' for the other parties to the dispute as well. By mitigating anarchy for a single subordinate, in turn, the dominant state reduces the security dilemma for its neighbours that might otherwise fuel suspicion and conflict.20
In short, the benefits of a social order provided for a single subordinate may not be limited to that subordinate but can easily 'spill over' onto other neighbouring states or those in positions similar to that subordinate.
When social order has local public benefits, dominant states gain an incentive to capture or 'internalise' the political benefits by extending their rule over the other beneficiaries of that order.21 To the extent that neighbours get the benefits of social order Tor free' or without having to accept the rule of the dominant state, they have little incentive to yield their sovereignty or comply with the demands of that state.
The dominant state, however, can credibly threaten to side with the single subordi nate in disputes with others in the region, shifting the bargaining advantage in that subordinate's favour. This may induce others to subordinate themselves to the dominant state in order to keep the diplomatic playing field level. At an extreme, the dominant state can threaten direct coercion to force the beneficiaries of social order to accept its rule.
A key problem for the US in the early Cold War, for example, was precisely how to internalise the positive externalities created by the security provided to its subordinates in Western Europe and, especially, to West Germany.22 Through the occupation, the US both established a significant degree of authority over Germany and, in return, created a new social order that supported democracy within the defeated country and protected it from external threats, most notably from the Soviet 19 Given the clustering, the regional systems effect is absorbed into the dyadic measures of security and economic hierarchy (which correlate highly by region). Regional dummy variables, on the other hand, absorb much of the effect of security and economic hierarchy, rending the coefficients in the models whose implications are discussed above typically insignificant. This reflects not so much a lack of robustness, but rather the difficulty in separating the dyadic and regional effects of hierarchy. 20 Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, 30 (1978) . 21 See Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century, pp. 44-7. 22 Discussed in detail in Ibid., pp. 157-9.
Union and its imperial subordinate of East Germany. By limiting its sovereignty, the US integrated the Federal Republic into a Western system and effectively demilita rised its relations with its neighbours, in essence protecting other regional states from the possibility of future revanchism. By protecting Germany from potential Soviet expansionism, in turn, it also secured other European countries to the West. Although early in the period the US was committed to the occupation of West Germany, and all that entailed, it was not eager to engage with the rest of the continent, largely for fear that the Europeans would free ride and exploit its defence efforts. The solution, supported by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, was to multilateralise the American commitment to European defence while expanding the authority of the US over additional states and, through NATO, over the region as a whole.
The free rider problem was addressed, at American insistence, through Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which specified that countries should engage in 'continu ous and effective self-help and mutual aid'. For the Europeans, this article promised them access to the American aid and military resources they so desperately needed, while to the Americans it implied reciprocity and mutuality of effort. As Acheson emphasised to Britain and France in 1949, the US was 'not thinking in terms of "lend-lease" but of "mutual aid" \23 On-going pressure on the Europeans to increase their defence contributions and honour fully their commitments to NATO was institutionalised in the so-called Annual Review exercise, in which members publicly justified and explained any shortfalls from their defence targets.
American authority, especially over the security policies of its nominal allies, was established through the NATO hierarchy, and especially the position of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, always an American general reporting to the president.
In addition, and perhaps more important, the US gained additional authority through the bilateral agreements negotiated under Section 402 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which required that recipients of aid grant the US military facilities and specific military operating rights. As explored in more detail below, such bases always give the dominant state at least a measure of authority over the subordinate's security policy.
As additional leverage over all of the negotiations both about burden sharing and American authority within the region was the threat of German rearmament, unilaterally by the US if necessary but preferable under the auspices of NATO (but not under a wholly European command). By linking its troop commitments to Europe specifically to German rearmament, the US sought to mitigate the free rider problem and to extend its control over NATO and its member states. In this case, the authority over one subordinate, and the threat to favour Germany by unilaterally permitting and supporting its rearmament, was used effectively to expand the authority of the US over others in the region. Second, there are large economies of scale in producing social order for subordi nates. One of the largest costs to a dominant state in producing order is developing the military reach to protect a subordinate and, if necessary, enforce its rule in instances of non-compliance. The dominant state must invest in the technology and equipment to project force over distance -sea power in the 19th century, sea and air power in the 20th -and develop a local infrastructure of bases within a region. Once these large fixed costs are incurred for one subordinate state in a given region, however, the marginal costs of extending the social order to a second subordinate or beyond are very much lower.24
As an example, its substantial military presence in Panama, even after the repatriation of the Canal, gives the US the ability not only to project force in Panama but also in other countries in Central America. Thus, from its Panamanian bases, the US both launched its 1989 overthrow and seizure of President Manuel Noriega and, during the Reagan administration, trained and resupplied the Nicaraguan Contras. The US is similarly seeking a forward presence in the Persian Gulf from which it can project force throughout the region when necessary. In the Persian Gulf War of 1991, it first secured bases in Saudi Arabia, from which it was subsequently forced to withdraw, then in Qatar, Bahrain, and other smaller Persian Gulf states, and now in Iraq.
Increasing economies of scale create incentives for a dominant state to bring as many subordinates in a region under its rule as possible.25 It can do so by providing the order desired by potential subordinates at a lower 'price', defined in terms of a smaller reduction in sovereignty (or less hierarchy). Equivalently, it can also provide more social order for both the original and additional subordinates at the same cost. Combined with the positive externalities of social order, economies of scale permit a doubly beneficial bargain in which the dominant state reduces its costs of providing social order for a given subordinate and subordinates get more social order while yielding a smaller fraction of sovereignty than otherwise.
Third, and perhaps most important, multiple subordinates legitimate the domi nant state's hierarchy within a region and permit greater and more effective enforcement of its rule. Authority and, specifically, the right to punish noncompli ance ultimately rest on the collective acceptance or legitimacy of the ruler's right to rule. It is conferred by the ruled, not claimed by the ruler. As Flathman notes, 'sustained coercion is impossible without substantial agreement among the members of the association about those very propositions whose rejection commonly brings coercion into play'.26 If recognised as legitimate, the ruler acquires the ability to punish dissidents or rule violators because of the broad backing of others. Political authority is, thus, never a relationship between a ruler and a single subject, but rather derives from a collective that confers rights or legitimacy upon the ruler.
Dyadic hierarchy, as explained above, entails a dominant state exercising greater or lesser authority over a set of individuals who comprise the subordinate state. Just as individuals confer authority on their state over more or less of their lives, so these same individuals can confer varying authority on another state over particular policy areas through international hierarchies. Citizens collectively 'dollarize', granting a dominant state authority over their monetary policy. By inviting or at least 24 This holds up to some point where distance and complexity cause the marginal costs to flatten out and, perhaps, to increase, creating diseconomies of scale. This cost structure interacts with geography. Although air power that allows a dominant state to project force to one region of the globe is interchangeable, to the extent that local infrastructure remains necessary to support power projection economies of scale will not increase indefinitely. A base in Central America, for instance, will not substitute for a base in Northeast Asia. recognise the legitimacy of the dominant state's authority. Where we might expect the legitimacy of the dominant state's authority to evaporate because of the withdrawal or absence of support by individual citizens, it can endure (if in somewhat attenuated form) due to the legitimacy conferred by other, similarly placed regional states. In this way, the effort of the US to discipline Cuba for rejecting its informal empire was supported and legitimated by other Latin American countries through the OAS, which declared that adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology is incompatible with the inter-American system (1962, only Cuba voted against), unanimously voted to quarantine Cuba during the missile crisis (1964), and voted for mandatory sanctions covering all trade (except food and medicine) and the severing of diplomatic relations (1964) .28
As a result of positive externalities, economies of scale, and greater legitimacy, dominant states have strong incentives to seek regional hierarchy. Since dominant states can offer to provide order at lower cost or threaten to tilt the regional playing field in favour of one state or another, subordinates also have incentives to subordinate themselves to their rule. Once in place, the regional hierarchy becomes self-reinforcing as subordinates further legitimate the rule of the dominant state. We should, as a consequence, see a strong regional clustering of international hierarchies. I compute an aggregate indicator of US security hierarchy as the simple sum of the indices of US troops deployed per capita and the number of independent alliances, again, normalised to one for 1995. According to the aggregate index, Panama was the most subordinate state in the system in 1995. Economic hierarchy between states varies from market exchange, at the anarchic end of a continuum, to dependency, at the hierarchic end. It is also captured by two indicators. First, economic hierarchy varies inversely with a country's monetary policy autonomy, which is defined, in turn, by its exchange rate regime.33 Key to any economy's prices and monetary stability is its exchange rate regime, or how the price of its national currency is set relative to the price of other currencies. At one extreme, a country can allow its currency to float against others, with its exchange rate being determined by demand and supply in financial markets. Under floating exchange rates, domestic monetary policy is freed from concerns about the current account balance and, thus, implies no economic hierarchy. At the other extreme, a country adopts the currency of a foreign state as its own, a process known as 'dollarization' but actually more general than the name implies. Even though small amounts of the national currency may remain in circulation, the country uses the foreign currency as regimes are coded here into a four point scale ranging from various floating exchange rate mechanisms, to a crawling peg relative to the dollar, a fixed exchange rate to the dollar, and finally to a 'merged' currency in the form of either a currency board or 'dollarization'. At each step on this scale, the tie between the country's currency and the dollar becomes tighter and more costly to break, giving the US more control over the subordinate country's monetary policy. This index is also normalised by its highest value in 1995 (common to 11 countries, mostly in the Caribbean and Central America).
Economic hierarchy is also implied by trade dependence. Trade has long been understood to create the potential for political influence. This key insight parallels that on independent alliances in security hierarchies. If a state has many trade partners it is likely to have greater political autonomy and any attempt to manipulate trade for political purposes will be ineffective. If a country is highly dependent on trade with another, however, it is vulnerable to the influence of that state. Countries trade for many reasons. Nonetheless, the failure of governments over the long term to diversify their trading partners indicates a tacit acceptance of the dominant state's potential influence and therefore its legitimacy and authority. Relative trade dependence is measured as each country's total trade with the US divided by its own GDP, minus similar ratios for the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. The index is truncated at a zero (no hierarchy) and normalised to one for the highest value in 1995 (Canada). Countries that trade more as a percentage of GDP with the US than with all the other permanent security council members are relatively trade dependent, and countries that trade more with the other great powers states than with the US are relatively independent.
As with the security measures, I compute an aggregate indicator of US economic hierarchy as the simple sum of two indices, again normalised to one for 1995 By this measure, Canada is the state most economically subordinate to the US in 1995.
Using these indicators, we can now map the pattern of hierarchy by region, using the RSCs as defined by Buzan and Waever.34 As expected, there is a strong regional clustering to the hierarchies possessed by the US. Regionally, the US dominates more states in North and South America, its traditional areas of concern, than elsewhere. The US possesses at least a measure of hierarchy over nearly every country in its hemisphere (see Figures 1 and 2) . The 'American system' that was constructed by the US in the early decades of the 20th century persists to this day. This dominance is especially strong over states on the Caribbean littoral (included in North America). Although economic hierarchy declined sharply from the mid-1970s to 1990, it has since rebounded and is now both deep and broad. Although higher in North than South America, the regional dominance of the US appears strong and robust.
After World War II, the US extended its security and economic hierarchies beyond the Western hemisphere to Europe (see Figure 3) .37 Until the 1990s, the countries of countries in which they were stationed starting to decline after 1991. Despite the realignment of international power that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, America's hierarchies in Europe were clearly waning -even as a number of important countries, including the UK and Germany, remained subordinate to the US.
Nonetheless, in 2000, a larger proportion of the countries most subordinate to the US in security were in Europe than in the 1950s. The US also enjoyed relatively high levels of security and economic hierarchy in East Asia, especially during the early Cold War (Figure 4) . US security hierarchy peaked during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, but then fell far below levels in the Western hemisphere and West Europe by 1973. Conversely, US economic hierarchy rose steadily and reached a plateau from the early 1970s on. There is, however, wide variation in US hierarchy within the RSC, with considerably higher levels in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea) and select countries in Southeast Asia 
Regional orders
There is a strong correlation between level and the regional order that predominates either their level of hierarchy or orde characteristics do tend to cluster spatially. as described by Buzan and Waever.40 As is US security and economic hierarchy (from or more peaceful regional orders less prone In South Asia and Southern Africa, levels of security and economic hierarchy are quite low, on average, and the US plays a relatively minor role in each region. 41 In East Asia and the Middle East, the US also has relatively little authority and typically interacts with members of the RSC as simply one of several great powers in a balance of power order.42 Although lacking precise data on the indicators, anecdotal evidence suggests that, although Britain and France retain some residual hierarchies in some of their former colonies (for example France in Chad), these are not extensive. Buzan and Waever, in turn, describe each RSC as a conflict formation characterised by 'a pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations'. 43 The origins of the insecurity that plagues each region is different, ranging from the internal weakness of post-colonial states in Africa to regional power rivalries in South Asia to great power rivalries in East Asia. But in each, the use of force in relations between states is largely unregulated, as might be expected in a traditionally 'anarchic' environment as understood in international relations theory.
Within the conflict formations that characterise these regions, ASEAN stands out as a nascent security regime or collective security organisation. 44 An autonomous development formed almost entirely outside of US hierarchy -and in many ways, in opposition to outside influences within the region-this emergent order is the principal anomaly here between hierarchy and more peaceful regional orders. ASEAN was founded in 1967 near the peak of US involvement in Vietnam, an extreme subordinate during the war, but flowered into a collective security organis ation only after the US withdrew from both Vietnam and the regional more generally. ASEAN's growth into a collective security organisation was halted and possibly reversed, however, by the economic crisis of the late 1990s, the organisa tion's failure to deal effectively with the fragmentation of East Timor, and the reemergence of security tensions between Singapore and Malaysia and new ones between Thailand and Burma.45
The Post-Soviet and South American RSCs have elements of security regimes in place that do not eliminate the fear or threat of war but do regulate the conduct of states in the use of force. Despite the absence of any US hierarchy in the region, the Post-Soviet sphere is nonetheless hierarchically organised. Although I do not have consistent data on levels of hierarchy similar to that for the US, Russia dominates its neighbourhood and regulates potential conflict between itself and its subordinates and between other dyads in the region.46 This is consistent with the larger argument here on US hierarchy and regional orders.
In South America, and specifically the Southern cone region, Buzan and Waever point to the rise of a security regime under a regional concert of powers despite continued antagonisms and occasional sabre-rattling between member states. Yet, South America remains highly penetrated by the US, in Buzan and Waever's term, and the security regime has developed under the umbrella of continued American hierarchy.47 By providing a measure of security to South America, such that conflicts do not escalate to actual violence, and by prohibiting other great powers from becoming involved in disputes, the US has created a foundation upon which the regional powers, especially Argentina and Brazil, can develop their own rules for further managing regional relations. The pacifying effect of US hierarchy in South America may be seen in contrast to South Asia where two comparable regional powers-India and Pakistan -have failed to regulate their conflict in similar ways. That South Asia was penetrated and certainly more deeply integrated into the superpower competition of the Cold War than South America is directly related to the US sphere of influence constructed over the latter region in the early 20th century. 48 The two regions with the 'highest' level of regional order are also characterised by high average levels of US hierarchy. In North America, the US has long exercised authority over the member states, providing basic security, adjudicating disputes, and disciplining subordinates who either posed a threat to others in the region or threatened to leave the informal empire. In turn, the subordinate states have largely compiled with the restrictions on their sovereignty perceived as necessary to the maintenance of the regional order. Strikingly, the exercise of US hierarchy and the regional order itself is not institutionalised in a true multilateral body. Rather, the Organization of American States -even with a large contingent of South American members -has largely been an instrument of the US. The security community has also developed without a common identity. Although NAFTA has gone some distance toward creating a common North American identity for the US, Canada, and Mexico -linking the latter to its northern neighbours in a shared space for, perhaps, the first time in history -no common identity has been forged with the rest of Central America or the numerous island states of the Caribbean.49 This raises significant doubts, contrary to Adler and Barnett, about whether either multilateral institutions or a common identity are necessary conditions for a pluralistic security community. 50 West Europe began the postwar era in ways similar to North America. The US provided basic security within the region, both suppressing conflicts between members states, especially between Germany and its neighbours, and deterring possible expansionism by the Soviet Union. In return, regional states compiled with an American-led security and economic regime that locked them into tight inter dependence with one another. The regional hierarchy of the US pre-existed the rise of the pluralistic security community, as in North America, and appears to have contributed to its development. It was, at least, what Adler and Barnett describe as a 'tier two' factor that was 'conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity' of a pluralistic security community.51 As in the case of the security regime in South America, this higher level regional order was built on a foundation of order created by the US. Unlike in North America, however, the hierarchy of the US has been superseded by a collective or supranational hierarchy in the form of the European Union, at least in economic affairs. This has led, in turn, to greater institutionalisation and an emergent European identity, a 'tier three' factor in Adler and Barnett's scheme.52 As US economic hierarchy in Europe disappeared over the course of the 1970s, the European Union rose to fill the gap. Nonetheless, the trajectory suggests that pluralistic security communities require not so much a common institution or identity as a measure of international authority and hierarchy that protects, constrains, and disciplines member states. As US security hierarchy in West Europe has diminished since the end of the Cold War (see Figure 3) , it remains an open question whether Europe can forge a supranational foreign and defence policy. Collective identity may be the glue that holds countries together and allows nascent pluralistic security communities to evolve into mature communities or even integrated communitiesthe highest level of regional order. The relationship between regional hierarchy and regional order presented here is one of correlation rather than causation. To be confident of causal effects will require more detailed research into the hows and whys of producing regional security. But the evidence here clearly suggests that hierarchy may be a necessary and is certainly a facilitating condition for pluralistic security communities to arise.
Conclusion
Adopting a relational conception of authority reveals international hierarchies now hidden by a formal-legal approach. In turn, the degree of hierarchy between states and in regions has important implications for state behavior and regional order, respectively. In providing order to build and sustain their authority over subordi nates, dominant states also create order within regions. Greater US hierarchy, as we have seen, is plausibly related to higher or more peaceful regional orders. To the extent that the post-Soviet RSC possesses a higher level security regime, this may also be a function of Russian hierarchy within the region. Understood in this way, ASEAN appears to be the only security regime or higher order that has developed outside some regional hierarchy. Collective identities may support pluralistic security communities, but they appear to follow rather than begin a process that both theoretically and empirically is associated with regional hierarchy. The key unanswered questions, it seems to me, relate to What makes a region a 'region'? and How are these traits related to regional hierarchy and order? Like authority, regions themselves are political constructs. RSCs are not fixed and static, but change members and evolve over time. Regions are sets of states affected by security externalities that arise from a common geographic centre. Security exter nalities are affected by technology, the 'stopping power of water',53 and other exogenous factors, but they are also influenced by the quality of hierarchy and regional order. In particular, when dominant states produce a measure of order as a condition for earning authority, they also shape the security policies of states and the nature of the security externalities that define the region. Hierarchy, order, and the region itself are mutually constituted. Similarly, the legitimacy granted by regional states to a dominant state creates and shapes its authority. By complying with its commands and supporting its enforcement actions against rebels within the region, member states empower the dominant state to act authoritatively to produce the order they desire. Sorting through these tangled causal arrows remains tremendously difficult.
Despite the end of the post-Cold War era on 11 September 2001, the trend that Morgan and I identified toward the disaggregation and r?gionalisation of security continues.54 Except for a handful of great powers, and perhaps only the US, the demonstrated global reach of both states and terrorists does not a global threat make.
Where the bipolar competition or overlay of the Cold War drew many into its web, for most states today their security concerns are almost entirely local. Regions are an increasingly salient unit of analysis. As is now clear, regions vary substantially in their structures -including levels of hierarchy -and order. Policy should recognise these important differences.
A danger for the US -and through it, others -is that in its new insecurity brought on by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and its poorly executed (and ill-advised) war in Iraq, it will once again see the world through the single lens of the global war on terror. In the 1990s, US policy was largely but incrementally, hesitantly, following the trend toward the r?gionalisation of security. At least under the administration of President George W. Bush, this movement was reversed and other countries were pressed to choose sides in what is perceived by many Americans as a global battle.
The US risks treating threats in one region the same as threats in others. Even radical
Islam, which could be perceived as a worldwide movement, means very different things and requires very different responses in, say, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Southeast Asia. The need to think and act regionally remains real -and a continuing challenge.
